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This report analyses the venture capital industry and the role venture capitalists play
in initial public offerings (IPO). Venture capitalists invest in the private equity market.
They provide financial support and professional expertise in exchange for equity of their
portfolio companies. These companies have attractive growth potential, but lack access to
typical sources of external financing such as public securities markets or credit markets.
With its history tracing back to the Middle Ages, the venture capital industry has
expanded most rapidly during the post World War n Era. Prior to this time, wealthy
individuals were the main source of investment capital; however, the industry is now
characterized by more institutional investors such as pension funds.
The industry is organized by four different types of venture capital firms: corporate
industrial groups, independent private capital firms, venture capital subsidiaries of fmancial
corporations, and small business investment companies (SBIC). Typical sources of venture
capital are pension funds, insurance companies, endowments, and corporate and foreign
investors. There are specific geographic concentrations for capital commitments and
disbursements.
Venture capitalists, focusing on high growth industries, typically hold their investment
for five to ten years. During this time, they often provide multiple rounds of fmancing to
their portfolio company and actively monitor its business operations. As the portfolio
company progresses through the various stages of the business development process, the risk
level of the investment decreases. Since industry returns vary from period to period, experts
believe the venture capital industry is cyclical.
The second objective of this report is to determine the role of the venture capitalist in
the IPO process. An IPO is the first issuance of public securities by a company. Typically,
the IPO results in large positive returns in the first day of public trading. Many underpricing
theories are examined in this report to explain the large initial returns.
The IPO is a very popular exit strategy for venture capitalists. It allows them to
liquidate their equity holding and realize a return on investment. In order to understand the
relationship between the venture capital industry and the IPO process, I recorded the stock
characteristics and tracked the perfonnance of almost every venture-backed IPO of 1992. I
collected 20 days of closing prices for 147 individual securities and the market index. With
this data, I calculated the daily returns and used regression analysis to explain the role
venture capitalists play in the IPO process.
.. VENTURE CAPITAL DEFINED
. The venture capital industry covers a wide range of investments in the private equity market. Venture
i
capitalists provide seed, startup, and expansion financing to businesses demonstrating viability, but lacking
access to the public securities market or to the credit-oriented institutional funding sources. These financial
intermediaries provide risk capital to companies that offer high potential returns (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and
Vetsuypens, p. 449.)
However, in their role as financial intermediaries, venture capitalists provide more than just capital.
Venture capitalists also contribute their business expertise and actively monitor an entrepreneurial firm's
development as an information intermediary. With an investment horizon averaging at least five to ten years, in
order to achieve significant returns, venture capitalists try to add value to the developing firm (Morris, p. 7).
This is achieved by participating directly in management, using their industry contacts to recruit key employees,
assisting in production, and developing customer relations (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens, p. 450).
Like leveraged buyout (LBO) specialists, venture capitalists also actively improve performance of companies.
However, LBO specialists invest in mature companies with historical and predictable cashflows (Barry,
Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens, p. 448). Venture capitalists are unique, therefore, by serving as the
critical bridge between entrepreneurs and the capital markets.
mSTORY OF VENTURE CAPITAL
Techniques for financing high-risk illiquid ventures have existed ever since the Middle Ages when
merchants, nobles, and clergy recycled their wealth by underwriting voyages and commercial ventures (Wilson,
p. 13). Queen Isabella served the role of a venture capitalist when she backed Christopher Columbus.
With the Industrial Revolution, however, entrepreneurs had to rely more on their own capital or seek
financing from suppliers or customers (Wilson, p. 14). Informal venture capital provided by friends, relatives,
and local merchants was the most common source of financing for American entrepreneurs in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. During the pre-World War II era, the venture capital investors were limited to wealthy







fulfilled an urgent need by providing financial services that capitalize on the opportunities from the explosive
changes in science and technology. By finding, evaluating, and funding promising ideas, these American
venture capitalists developed successful companies such as Eastern Airlines, Minute Maid, and American
Research and Development Corporation (Wilson, pp. 15, 18, & 19).
However, World War II changed the American economic, social, and business environment. The
creation of the formal venture capital industry was sparked by many post-World War II conditions. The rapid
economic expansion encouraged new products based on new technologies and discoveries. This provided many
avenues for venture capital funding. The increasing dominance of large corporations created a more institution-
alized and hierarchical work environment. This required private companies to have adequate capital and skilled
dedicated management to successfully compete against these large firms. Finally, faced with growing demand
for their loan money, banks and other financial intermediaries were unwilling to provide adequate fmancial
support for unproven, risky investments in private ventures.
The Small Business Investment Company Act of 1958 created small business investment companies
(SBICs) as vehicles to provide capital for small businesses. SBICs offered tax advantages and were the first
product of the organized venture capital industry. By 1960, over 585 SBICs were licensed (Morris, p. 7). The
industry's growth and performance, however, declined due to inadequate private capitalization, excessive
government regulation, and lack of management experience (Morris, p. 7).
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, new private venture emerged. Unlike the SBICs that received
government financing, funding for the private venture capital firms came from institutional investors such as
insurance companies, pension funds, and bank trust departments (Morris, p. 8). These new venture firms
invested heavily in early-stage financing for young businesses. With failures becoming evident early, and
successful firms stung by the recession of 1974 and 1975, the institutional investors began to question the
venture capitalists' investment strategies. However, the maturing venture partnerships started to reap the
rewards from their value-added management and long-term investment horizon to earn approximately 25 percent
compounded annual return (Morris, p. 8).
3The adverse economic pressures experienced in the mid 1970s, however, did have an impact on the
venture capital industry. Venture capitalists were forced to widen their investment interest and to encourage
greater industry cooperation. Investment dollars were also targeted to later-stage expansion financing that would
have formerly received capital from public market underwritings (Morris, p. 8). By 1979, less than $200
million was committed to venture capital funds (National Venture Capital Association Annual Report, p. 4).
The venture capital industry experienced rapid growth during the 1980s. The stock market was
receptive to emerging growth businesses and venture-backed companies on the public market encouraged more
activity in this dynamic industry. Venture capitalists raised $4.5 billion in 1983 compared to only $1.8 billion
raised one year earlier (Morris, p. 9). The growth was fueled by the reduction of the capital gains tax and
increased pension fund investments in venture capital partnerships (Morris, p. 9). With more institutional
investors and fewer high-net-worth individuals, the rules of the venture capital game changed. In contrast to the
previous buy-and-hold investment mentality, the institutional investors brought concepts of asset allocation,
quarterly valuations, liquidity, and faster return on investments (Bavaria, p. 18). These investors gravitated
toward later-stage financing because they were less labor intensive, involved larger, more well-known
companies, and provided faster paybacks.
CURRENT TRENDS IN THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY
The trend for venture capitalists to invest in larger funds is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Big institutional
investors, such as pension funds, invest large amounts of money. The only way, however, to invest it all
without owning the company is to invest in funds that are themselves very large (Bavaria, p. 18).
The venture capital community experienced growth from $12.1 billion under management ten years ago
to over $30 billion at the end of 1991. See Figure 1. The number of venture capital firms have declined from
a high of 670 in 1989 to 640 in 1991 (National Venture Capital Association Annual Report, p. 14). This has
created a positive environment for the remaining funds. With reduced competition, the venture capitalists are
investing in companies with more conservative risk valuations. The current trend in the venture capital industry
4is to provide later-stage financing to medical- and software-related businesses. These segments received 33
percent of all disbursements in 1990 and 35 percent in 1991 (National Venture Capital Association Annual
Report, p. 35).
FIGURE I
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FIGURE 2
Venture Capital Under Management by Type of Finn
$Millions
1986* 1987* 1988* 1989# 1990# 1991#
Independent Private $18,800 $23,380 $25,725 $27,287 $28,853 $26,590
Corporate Financial $2,660 $3,108 $2,868 $4,807 $4,596 $3,810
Corporate Industrial $2,040 $1,890 $2,083 $2,334 $2,499 $2,470
SBICs $640 $640 $463 nIa nla nIa
Total Industry $24,140 $29,018 $31,139 $34,427 $35,948 $32,870
Source: Venture Economics
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TYPES OF VENTURE CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS
There are four primary types of venture capital organizations. The source of funds, type of venture
capital financing, and motives for venture capital investments vary among each of these organizations.
Independent private venture capital firms are the principal institutional source of venture capital for large
corporations. Corporate industrial groups also contribute for strategic as well as investment opportunities.
Extending their lending and investment analysis techniques, financial corporations provide venture capital
through subsidiaries. Finally, many SBICs are lending companies that represent the only institutional source of
long-term capital for small businesses (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," pp. 69-70). Figure
2 shows the venture capital under management for the four types of firms.
Note:
* SBICs which are affiliated with an independent private or corporate group are not counted under the SBIC category,
but instead with their affiliated group.
From 1989 on, SBICs category will not be included and the SBICs private capital and government leverage will be




The independent private capital firms are usually organized as a limited partnership. Limited
partnership income is not subject to corporate taxation. The law requires a specific termination date, restricted
. transfer of limited partnership units, and prohibits withdrawal from the partnership prior to termination
.
(Sahlman, p. 490). Tax benefits and legal constraints provide the greatest motivation to set up the private
independent venture capital firm as a limited partnership (Kozmetsky,Gill, and Smilor, p. 14). The venture
.
capitalists serve as the general partners and actively manage the partnerships' investment portfolios. Typically,
general partners provide only one percent of the capital raised (Sahlman, p. 490). The investors take a more
III passive role as limited partners. At the end of 1991,497 independent firms were operating in the United States
.
(National Venture Capital Association, p. 14). The independent private venture capital firms invest primarily in
equity, seed, and startup financing, as well as some mature companies and management buyouts (Pratt, "The
III
Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 68). A management buyout provides the second type of venture
capital organization in the corporate industrial group. With the benefits of direct venture capital financing
.
becoming apparent in the late 1960s and 1970s, corporate managers saw venture capital investments as an
opportunity to gain a "window of technology" (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
Ii
Instead of focusing on long-term value-added management and business development, corporate managers
.
perceived these investments strictly as a source of technology to enhance their current operations. Industrial
corporate venture investment activity increased by 1987 with 86 groups versus only 30 groups in 1977 (Pratt,
.
"The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
Corporate managers, placing their own firm's primary business activity first at all times, rarely commit
Ii
consistent value-added management and capital necessary to develop their venture capital investment into a
II
thriving new business. Because of this, corporate industrial groups rarely meet the seven to ten year investment
horizon typical for the venture capital industry (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
.
The Board of Directors and corporate managers often do not have the patience required to develop attractive
returns from their venture capital investment. It is difficult to maintain a generous supply of capital to the
Ii investment when the investment has been operating at a loss and company-wide capital is lean.
111
III
7As venture investors, however, corporations can be very helpful to their portfolio companies by
developing new technology and providing distribution channels. They rely on their venture investments to
provide the innovation they lack. The strategic benefits and opportunities that the venture investments provide,
therefore, motivate corporate industrial groups to invest in small businesses. The strategic partnering
relationship may also provide diversification. With this motive, the corporation invests in fields that are
unrelated to the current operations and not influenced by similar external forces.
Aside from acquiring a minority equity investment in the small business, the industrial group may also
set up a side agreement with the new business. This may include a research and development contract, a
licensing agreement, or the formation of a joint venture (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community,"
p.69).
Like the independent venture capital firms, the non-public subsidiaries of corporate industrial groups
may be organized as a limited partnership with the sponsoring company acting as the general partner. The
subsidiary may also be set up as a royalty partnership in which the sponsoring company pays the partnership
royalties in exchange for an exclusive technology license for manufacturing and marketing the innovation. The
equity partnership method entails the formation of a new corporation after the technology is developed
(Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 23). Finally, a joint venture allows both companies to share in the venture's
profits. The sponsoring company may provide manufacturing and distribution expertise while the new company
brings the product innovation and R&D.
The third type of venture capital organization is the venture capital subsidiary of financial corporations.
In the early 1960s, banks viewed venture capital as an extension of their lending and credit-oriented activities.
Without recognizing the need to provide ongoing active management and expertise, the early results were not
favorable. However, in the 1970s, many financial corporations, especially bank holding companies, used SBICs
to set up non-SBIC separated subsidiaries to invest in business development situations (Pratt, "The Organized
Venture Capital Community," p. 69). This provides an opportunity to finance riskier investments that do not
meet the usual investment criteria, or that do not qualify under SBIC regulations. The subsidiary, however, is
limited to five percent of the parent's capital (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
8Regardless of whether the subsidiary is formed as a private independent partnership, a separate wholly-
owned corporation, or a division of the parent financial corporation, the parent remains the sole investor in the
venture capital subsidiary. Commitments to individual portfolio companies range from $1 million to $5 million,
and are usually targeted in later-stage business developments and LBOs (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital
Community," p. 69). At the end of 1991, 63 corporate financial groups managed $3.8 billion in venture capital
accounts. These numbers, as shown in Figure 2, have declined since 1989 (National Venture Capital
Association Annual Report, p. 14). While some venture capital subsidiaries, like the Bankers Trust of New
York, specialize in LBOs, the majority of subsidiaries have a broad investment spectrum (Pratt, "The Organized
Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
Finally, the last type of venture capital organization is the SBIC. SBICs are government-backed but
privately-owned organizations that were created in 1958 and regulated through the Small Business Administra-
tion. They are the only institutional source of long-term capital for small businesses. SBlCs make long-term
financing available to SBA-defined small businesses at favorable market rates. SBICs receive their initial
capitalization from private sources and also obtain funds from the government or government-guaranteed loans.
With this capital, SBICs make subordinated or unsecured loans, or equity investments in small business that
could not receive financing through banks or the private equity market (Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 20).
With regulations limiting the capital investment in any single company, lending SBICs make numerous small
disbursements to portfolio companies. Because SBICs use government loans to acquire investment capital, they
usually avoid straight equity investments for early-stage companies, favoring instead, preferred stock or debt
(Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 70). SBICs operate across a more diverse range of
venture investment interests; therefore, they provide an attractive source of financing more modest, or lower
risk, businesses.
The government-sponsored venture capital investments by SBICs have a medium risk, return, and time
horizon target. By focusing on attracting new businesses, SBICs trade off high returns associated with riskier





CAPITAL SOURCES OF INDEPENDENT PRIVATE FUNDS
9
Managing over 80 percent of all venture capital, the independent private capital firms have tapped
many sources of funds. The independent private capital firms are supported by high net worth individuals,
pension funds, major corporations, endowments, insurance companies, and foreign investors. As Figure 3
shows, the various sources of venture capital funds each have their own trend for investing. The economy,
regulatory environment, and financial strength of the sources cause the distribution commitments to vary.
FIGURE 3
SOURCES OF 1991 CAPITAL COMMITMENTS
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VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOCUS
Venture capitalists finance businesses with high growth potential. In order to evaluate an
entrepreneur's likely growth and profitability, the venture capitalist assesses the management, the entrepreneur's
commitment level, and the potential market for the product or service. In addition, the venture capitalist must
also look at the growth and attractiveness of the industry. It is not surprising that many growth companies are
concentrated in a handful of high growth industries such as the medical, computer, and technology fields. See
Figure 4.
The National Venture Capital Association Annual Report highlights the industry concentrations for
investment capital. In 1991,50 percent of the capital investments went to three industries: software and
services, telephone and data communications, and computer hardware and systems (p. 2). The medical and
health related companies declined 5 percent from 1990 to receive only 11 percent of the venture capital in 1991.
This capital was used to finance, for instance, Medimmune, a company that specializes in medical therapeutics
(Venture Capital Journal, "IPO Aftermarket," p. 69). Biotechnology companies were stable, receiving 8
percent of the investment capital. Finally, computer software and services received 25 percent of the total
capital in 1991.
STAGES OF VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING
There are eight stages of venture capital investing. Multi-stage financing is used as a built-in system of
checks and balances in which more capital is available after the new company has reached each successive
milestone. It also reduces investment risk and provides more accurate projections. As the venture capitalist
provides more capital in later financing stages, however, they demand more equity relative to the contributed
capital since the value of the equity is diluted (Merrill and Nichols, p. 83). This reduces the amount of equity




CAPITAL DISBURSEMENTS BY INDUSTRY








































Seed investment is the earliest type of investment made in a venture. The venture capitalist provides a
small amount of capital to an inventor or entrepreneur to determine whether their idea deserves further
consideration. Investments rarely exceed $50,000. The capital is used to prove a concept, build a prototype, or
fund product development (Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 8).
Startup financing goes to companies that are less than one year old. The capital is used for prototype
testing, test marketing, analysis of market penetration potential, and formation of a management team to define
the business plan (Sahlman, p. 479).
First-stage financing provides capital for early development stages of the venture. Assuming that the
prototypes are attractive, the technical risk is relatively low, and the marketing studies reflect adequate demand,
management will use the capital to set up manufacturing and shipping operations (Sahlman, p. 479). Initial
sales, however, will likely be unprofitable.
Second-stage financing provides expansion capital for equipment purchases, inventory, and receivable
fmancing (Sahlman, p. 479). At this stage, the company has received feedback from the market and realizes
that the speed and limits to product growth is influenced by the capital available for sales, marketing, and
production.
In the third stage of venture capital investing, companies undergo rapid expansion that requires more
working capital than can be generated from its internal cash flow. Attractive sales growth and positive profit
margins reduce the investment risk. The company is profitable, but relies on the venture capitalist to fund plant
expansion, marketing, working capital, or product improvement (Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 9). Some
funds may be supplied by banks if the company can provide adequate collateral from assets or receivables.
For fourth-stage companies, capital may be needed to sustain growth, but the investment risk is low
enough to permit them to obtain credit through commercial banks. This allows management to substitute bank
loans in order to limit equity dilution in the new business. The company, at this stage, is experiencing rapid
growth toward the liquidity point.
II
Other $0.089 $0.258 $0.162 $0.126 $0.05 $0.151
LBO/Aquisition $0.601 $0.804 $1.127 $0.71 $0.346 $0.046
Expansion $1.416 $1.773 $1.51 $1.596 $0.997 $0.734
Other Early $0.509 $0.603 $0.585 $0.537 $0.327 $0.295
Startup $0.526 $0.452 $0.349 $0.288 $0.142 $0.076
Seed $0.101 $0.087 $0.114 $0.138 $0.06 $0.056
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The next stage of venture capital investing, the bridge stage, provides the company with capital to
sustain its rapid growth until it can access the public security markets. Mezzanine investments are sensitive to
market conditions, such as interest rates, feasibility of acquisitions or leveraged buyouts, and the activity in the
IPO market (Sahlman, p. 479).
Finally, the liquidity stage is the time at which the venture capitalist can "cash out" their holdings in a
company. The exit strategy may utilize an IPO, acquisition, or LBO.
Figure 5 shows the amount of capital disbursements by financing stage. In 1991, 36 percent of
disbursed capital, or $485 million, went to fund seed or early-stage projects. However, the majority, 46 %, of






















In order to control entrepreneurs, the venture capitalist provides funds in stages and at progressively
higher prices as each development milestone is reached. Entrepreneurs, therefore, relinquish substantial shares
.
of equity for relatively smaller, but necessary cash infusions to overcome the critical early stages of business
.
development (Megginson and Mull, p. 3). By substituting stock ownership for higher current income, the
entrepreneur accepts the risks of poor performance (Sahlman, p. 510).
.
Venture capitalists use convertible preferred stock as an investment vehicle. Not only does it give the
venture capitalist preference in liquidation after creditors, but this hybrid security also allows the venture capital
.
investor to retain a proportional stake in superior performance. Taking up to 60 percent of a new company's
equity, the venture capitalist achieves a senior financial claim while enhancing the firm's borrowing capacity,
. since the stock increases the company's equity base (Megginson and Mull, p. 3).
.
Unlike the venture capitalist who invests in many ventures and may diversify to reduce its risk through
many venture capital projects funded through many syndicates, the entrepreneur typically holds an undiversified
.
portfolio. With a significant amount of money and "sweat equity," long hours and stressful dedication to the
venture invested in the company, an entrepreneur's acceptance of this risk provides strong support of their
. dedication and expected success of the venture.
.
A detailed level of analysis is needed to assess the risk-reward environment, management talent, and
growth potential for the venture. Out of 200 to 300 business proposals received annually, only 25 to 30 may
.
pass an initial screening process. After assessing which entrepreneur is most willing to accept the greatest risk
and most likely to achieve long-term growth, only five deals are funded. Of these five deals, there's a 20
. percent chance of business failure, a 20 percent chance for a healthy small private business, a 40 percent chance
.
the venture will merge with a major corporation, and a 20 percent chance it will go public (Kozmetsky, Gill,
and Smilor, p. 8).
. RETURN ON VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS
II The attractiveness of an investment is measured by the risk adjusted returns. Venture capital by its
I






returns. A venture capitalist, for example, may invest in five deals expecting that any three may come up short.
In order to continue to attract investments in venture capital funds, the two successful deals must provide
explosive returns to produce attractive average returns for the fund.
According to John Hancock Venture Capital Management, as early venture capital partnerships began
to mature in the late 1970s, the average 30 percent compound return for the venture investments clearly
exceeded any other alternative investment vehicle by at least 10 percent (Morris, p. 8). However, in the mid
1980s it fell to only 5 percent. An influx of many institutional investors with large commitments to venture
funds resulted in too many dollars chasing too few deals. With hundreds of institutions trying to tap the venture
capital industry, funding to venture capital partnerships jumped from less than $1 billion in 1982 to $4.2 billion
in 1987 (Bavaria, p. 17). The average returns for funds started before 1980 was six times higher than the
returns generated from funds in the mid 1980s (Bavaria, p. 17).
Returns on individual investments in the venture capital industry vary greatly. More than one-third of
the 383 investments made by 13 venture capital firms between 1969 and 1985 resulted in a negative realized
rate of return. However, more than one-third of the remaining investments resulted in returns greater than
twice its original cost for the investment (Sahlman, p. 483).
The time horizon for investments is an important variable influencing returns. The estimated average
holding period for a venture capital investment is 4.9 years. With roughly one-third of the individual
investments held for more than six years, the evidence supports that longer investment horizons are directly
related with investments with payoffs greater than five times the invested capital (Sahlman, p. 487).
Experts suggest, however, that the venture capital industry is cyclical with five to seven years of fat
returns with few investors followed by five to seven years of lean returns due to excess demand (Bavaria,
p. 16). With an estimated 3.8 percent loss on venture funds from 1985 to 1990, the cycle is predicted to reach
its valley and rebound with an average annual return of 25 percent over the next five to ten years (Bavaria,
p. 17).
As shown in Figure 6, the riskier early stage investments should provide a greater average return than
the more predictable, later-stage deals using mezzanine financing, for instance. In recent years, however, this
..
18
has not been the case. Recently, the highest returns have been from later-stage financing followed by raw
startups (Bavaria, p. 18). According to this evidence, in order to maximize risk-adjusted returns, a venture
capital firm should select existing profitable companies in attractive industries. This helps to explain the trend
toward later-stage financing. However, some venture capitalists favor startups due to the appeal of working
with a fledgling company to turn it into a winner promising glittering returns to the patient venture capitalist.
GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERA nONS
The geographic breakdowns for venture capital resources, commitments, and disbursements, indicate
the activity level and growth in the different regions of the United States. Historically, most of the venture
capital activity has been focused in the Northeast and West Coast. Venture capital, however, has been moving
to other areas of the U.S. over the last ten years (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 70).
With consistent monitoring and management of the portfolio company, many venture capital firms
invest capital in companies within a 200 mile radius. However, with more cooperative relationships among
firms, venture firms can use other groups located near the business opportunity to provide ongoing involvement
and direct links with the portfolio company.
Massachusetts, New York, and California are still the core business centers for venture capital. Since
1977, Massachusetts, New York, California, Illinois, and Connecticut have controlled approximately 77 percent
of the capital under management (National Venture Capital Association Annual Report, p. 10).
As seen in Figure 7, 40 percent of the money committed to private venture capital partnerships, $561
million, was raised in California. Massachusetts contributed $286 million or 21.4 percent. Although the
Northeast remains the source of 48 percent of total commitments to venture capital, this represented a decline
by 4 percent since 1990. Figure 8 shows this trend. The West Coast provided 16 percent more capital to
venture capital in 1991 than the year before. The Mid-Atlantic, however, fell from 11 percent in 1990 to only






















Just as investors contribute the majority of the venture capital funds, California and Massachusetts
companies received 60 percent of the capital disbursements. This amounts to $816 million of capital flowing
into these two states. The disbursements in 1991 are shown in Figure 9. As with capital contributions, the
I
I
West was the center for capital disbursements.
FIGURE 7
CAPITAL COMMITMENTS BY liMITED PARTNERS













West Coast 33 19 27 31 37 25 41
Southwest/Rockies 4 2 4 5 8 5 2
Midwest 7 3 17 9 13 12 6
Southeast 2 1 2 5 3 3 2
Mid-Atlantic 4 6 4 2 8 11 1























CAPITAL COMMITMENTS BY LIMITED PARNTERS































INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING (IPO)
An initial public offering (IPO) is the first issuance of public stock by a company. It is also referred to
as "going public." The IPO decision involves weighing the benefits and drawbacks of a public company.
Going public allows small companies to raise money by selling a portion of their business to public investors.
This provides liquidity for the founders and venture capitalists who can now sell and trade the stock in the
secondary market at its established fair market value. The company also has diversified its source of capital by
expanding it to include many unique investors. The small firm will also gain more respect in the business
community as a public company. This may be seen in more liberal terms for loans. Shares traded in the public
market make it easier to make acquisitions of other companies by simply exchanging shares (Perez, p. 142). A
public company can also effectively offer an incentive program to its workers in which employees are co-owners
in the company and share in its success. In this way, compensation is tied to the company's performance.
Although going public has many advantages, the decision to be a public firm is also accompanied with
some undesirable consequences. The public markets are very sensitive and uncertain. The founders, therefore,
are at the mercy of the market in valuing the firm. The company's founders lose more controlling power by
having to surrender more shares of equity in the IPO. A smaller company with a low stock price per share
must give up more equity in order to raise the same amount of capital as a large company with a higher stock
price. Few companies with less than $5 million in annual sales go public successfully (Taggart, Alexander, and
Arnold, p. 51). This may be due to the tremendous expenses incurred during the IPO and throughout its
existence as a public company. A public offering cost on average $617,000 (McCune, p. 28). Approximately
22 percent of all capital raised goes to cover the costs of being a public company (Taggart, Alexander, and
Arnold, p. 52). An estimated $100,000 in overhead is incurred annually to file reports with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEe) and other government agencies to cover legal and underwriter fees, to inform
stockholders, and to hire an auditing firm to review the company's accounting practices (Merrill and Nichols,
p. 135). In compliance with stringent and time-consuming reporting requirements, the company exposes its
financial performance and other critical data to the public which includes its competitors.
I
I 22
I The public marketplace in the 1960s was very liberal, allowing any company to raise money by goingpublic. In the 1970s, however, public financing was almost impossible for small companies (Pratt, "How to
I Raise Venture Capital," p. 196). Since the early 80's there has been a strong demand for IPOs of small
\
companies as shown in Figure 10. The success of firms, such as Hambrecht and Quist, specializing in raising
I money for emerging high growth companies provide further evidence of this trend.
I FIGURE 10
I
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Early studies of IPOs focused on the profit potential available in the new issues market. The results of
these studies show that new issues typically have large positive returns during a short period following the
offering. It is not rare to have initial returns above 17 percent (Ibbotson and Jaffe, p. 1037). During the post-
war era, however, there have been periods in which underpricing has been significantly larger and initial returns
well above the 17 percent mark. These periods are referred to as the "hot issue" market (Ibbotson and Jaffe,
p. 1027). "Hot Issue Markets" by Ibbotson and Jaffe examines new issues from January 1960 to October 1970
to predict "hot issue" markets. Their results imply that the first month returns are predictable and not random.
In order to receive a higher offer price, issuers should issue stock during a cold issue market.
The "hot issue" market was also analyzed by J. Ritter. Specifically, Ritter examined the 1980 IPO
market to test if high-risk IPOs are underpriced more than low risk IPOs (p. 215). During the IS-month period
from January 1980 to March 1981, initial returns averaged over 48 percent (Ritter, p. 215). If high-risk IPOs
are underpriced more than low-risk offerings, a heavy concentration of high-risk IPOs would explain the
excessive returns. The study, however, did not support this hypothesis. The high positive returns, instead,
were concentrated in one industry, the natural resources. The 1980 hot issue market, therefore, resulted from
underwriters exploiting the natural resources companies during the oil and gas boom to produce a rush of
discounted new issues in a concentrated industry (Ritter, p. 239).
A third explanation for underpricing of IPOs was developed in 1982 by Baron. This model states that
when the issuer and investment banker are not equally informed about the capital market, the more informed
banker will discount new issues (Baron, p. 975). In order to be compensated for this superior information, the
underwriter purposely sets lower offer prices; therefore, high initial returns result in the aftermarket.
In 1986, another theory of IPO underpricing was formulated. Rock, in his article "Why New Issues
are Underpriced," explains underpricing as a form of compensation for the uninformed investor to stay in the
market (p. 187). The informed investors know the appropriate value of a new issue; therefore, they buy securi-
ties at a price less than what they believe is their true market value. They do not subscribe to overpriced
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issues, issues selling at prices above this expected value. Uninformed investors, however, do not distinguish
between underpriced and overpriced securities. These investors, therefore, buy overpriced issues with negative
initial returns and underpriced issues with high positive returns. With no orders from informed investors for
overpriced issues, the uninformed investor receives 100 percent of the overpriced issues. This is called the
winner's curse. Competing with informed investors for the underpriced issues, however, the uninformed
investor gets only a ration of the discount issues. Ibbotson and Jaffe note that it is common,to receive
indications of interest for five times the number of underpriced shares available (Ibbotson and Jaffe, p. 1037).
Uninformed investors will leave the IPO market if they continue to receive poor returns from the overpriced
issues. The investment banks, therefore, purposely underprice IPOs to reward the uninformed investor for
bidding on overpriced securities and provide them an acceptable level of return from the rationed underpriced
issues. It is beneficial for the investment banker to do this because without the uninformed investor in the
market, the investment banker would be unable to distribute the overpriced issues.
In the 1988 article, "Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock," Tinic proposes that
underpricing is a form of insurance to fend off legal liability and to protect the reputations of investment
bankers (p. 789). Investment bankers have little historical information or operating and financial statistics to
support their offering price of new issues. In light of this uncertainty, the analysis and evaluation are
subjective. Under the Securities Act of 1933, investors can bring civil suits against investment bankers and
issuers for false or inadequate information on the registration statement (Tinic, p. 798). By selling IPOs at a
discount, investment bankers believe the large initial returns reduce the probability of a lawsuit.
VENTURE CAPITALIST'S lPO STRATEGY
For the venture capitalist, an initial public offering is the culmination of the "exit" plan. On this day,
the equity held by the founder, employees, and investors become liquid (Bartlett, p. 263). The venture
capitalist examines the exit possibilities before making an investment, giving preference to the investments with
the greatest number of exit options. The choice to exit via an IPO is influenced by the quality of the investee,






(Venture Capital Journal, "Exiting: New Patterns in the 1980s," p. 14). The cost of being a public firm, the
reporting requirements, and the risk of the public markets permit only the most attractive investments to go
public. During the second quarter of 1992, IPOs with the potential to be viable issues were trading below their
offer prices. This is not the result of business weaknesses, but rather a precipitous rush to take these attractive
investments public (Riordan, p. 42). Venture firms that invest in risky, but attractive investments commonly
use an IPO to liquidate their investments. Venture firms that look for home runs, invest with the intention of
taking it public.
Venture funds that specialize by industry reveal that the industry may impact the choice of exit vehicle.
Traditionally, medical and health related businesses, as well as biotechnology companies, have been leaders in
the IPO market (Venture Capital Journal, "Exiting: New Patterns in the 1980s," p. 14). This continued to hold
true for 1992 in which 25 percent of the IPOs were from medical and health industries and 16 percent from
biotechnology. Although these industries had the highest frequency in the 1992 IPO market, the best
performing issues came from two other industries; computer companies had a stock price increase of 51 percent
and telecommunications/data communication stock prices appreciated 43 percent (Riordan, p. 39).
The exit decisions for a venture capital investment is also influenced by the IPO environment. The IPO
window means that the public market is not consistently receptive to IPOs, but rather favors them during
different periods (Venture Capital Journal, "Exiting: New Patterns in the 1980s,"p. 14). When the IPO
window is open, the frequency and ease of going public increases.
UNDERPRICING THEORY OF VENTURE CAPITAL BACKED IPOS
Past research has identified many factors affecting the underpricing of IPOs. These include the level of
debt in the issuing firm's capital structure, the age of the company, the prestigiousness of the underwriter, the
existence of firm-specific information in the equity market, and the size of the firm (Garfinkel, p. 77). The
level of ex-ante uncertainty is also decreased by the existence of venture capital support (Barry, Muscarella,
Peavy, and Vetsuypens, p. 1). Venture capitalists specialize their investments to provide intensive monitoring
I
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I services that include holding a concentrated equity position, serving on the board of directors, and providingdistribution or marketing channels.
I Venture capitalists, since they are investors in the firm going public, provide third party certification
I
that the offering price reflects all available and relevant inside information (Megginson and Weiss, p. 879). An
unseasoned issue, with limited historical or financial supporting data, is associated with enormous uncertainty in
I the capital markets. This is evident in the first day returns of IPOs with 90 percent of the return earned in theopening transaction (Barry and Jennings, p. 54). Since informational asymmetries exist between the outside
I investors and the issuing company, the venture capital certification is valuable to reduce uncertainty. Venture
capital certification not only reduces asymmetrical information in the offering process, but also reduces the
I underpricing and total costs of going public (Megginson and Weiss, p. 83). This allows the issuing company to
I maximize the proceeds from the IPO. Venture capitalists also certifY the accuracy of the stock valuation byretaining a large percent of their equity holdings in the issuing firm after the IPO (Megginson and Weiss,
I p. 883). If the certification was false, the stock value would decline in the aftermarket, causing the venture
capitalists to suffer losses on their stock holdings and fall short in maximizing their return on investment.
I
THE CURRENT STUDY
I There were 151 venture-backed IPOs in 1992. For comparability, I considered only published stocks
I that were traded during the 21 days following the offering date. With these constraints, the study included 147
stocks. The daily closing price or average bid and ask price were recorded for each issue for the first 21
I trading days. I obtained these prices from Standard and Poor's Dailv Stock Price Record and The Wall Street
I
Journal. Figure 11 shows the characteristics of the sample. The large standard deviations of the securities
clearly show that the sample includes a diverse set of firms and issues. Of the 147 stocks, 3 are traded on the
I American Stock Exchange, 5 are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and the remaining 139 stocks are
traded in the Over-the-Counter (OTe) market.
I All reported returns are the daily price for each IPO. The first day IPO returns are calculated from the
I
offering price to the first trading day closing price. When bid and ask prices were listed, the closing price was
calculated as the average of these two numbers.
I
Shares Out- Offer Shares Offer Size Offer
standing OOOs OOOs $OOOs Price
Mean 8,497 2,458 $29,814 $11.151
Standard
Deviation 6,023 1,279 $22,329 $3.708
T Value 17.10 23.30 16.19 36.46
Minimum 850 475 $3,800 $4.75











I Prices of over 5,000 of the more than 40 million OTC issues are reported through the NationalAssociation of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System (NASDAQ). The market returns are measured
I by the NASDAQ Composite Index that measures over 2,900 NASDAQ National Marketing System (NMS)
issues, excluding warrants, as well as all domestic common stocks traded in the regular NASDAQ market. In
I total, the composite index tracks over 4,300 securities. All reported market returns are the daily percent change
I in the NASDAQ Composite Index corresponding to the offering date and the 20 succeeding days of eachindividuallPO.
I The reported market-adjusted returns are equal to the percent price change for the IPO issue minus the
percent change in the corresponding NASDAQ Composite Index.
I Figure 12 summarizes the raw returns and market-adjusted returns for the first 20 days of trading.
I
Since the venture-backed IPOs experience large initial returns during the first trading day, the data supports the
empirical and theoretical studies on IPO underpricing. The market rewarded the initial holder over a 12 percent











positive or negative return. This is consistent with prior research that realize investors in the after market do
not benefit from the initial underpricing. Approximately 90 percent of all IPO price adjustments take place
during the first initial trade (Barry and Jennings, p. 54).
The relationship between market returns and unadjusted stock returns is tested through linear regression
analysis. The market returns are the independent variable and the unadjusted stock returns are the dependent
variable. The market returns for the 147 stocks were regressed with the raw market returns to find the straight
line that approximates the relationship between the two variables. Estimated regression equations were
calculated for the 20 days of returns.
The coefficient of determination, R squared, gives the percentage of the values that can be explained by
assuming a linear relationship between daily market returns and daily venture-backed IPO returns. Thus, larger
R squared values indicated a stronger relationship.
The slope of the regression model is the covariance between the IPO returns and the market returns.
The covariance measures the extent to which the market returns and stock returns move together over time. A
large positive value slope explains that the variables move together in a direct positive relationship.
CONCLUSIONS
The R squared and X coefficients, slope, of the regression equations for each of the 20 days is listed in
Figure 13. The returns for day one, which includes the greatest underpricing adjustment, are strongly related to
the market returns as indicated by its large X coefficient value. This high X coefficient is also consistent with
its higher standard deviation for day one. The remaining 19 regression equations, representing the relationship
between the market and the after-market venture-backed IPO activity, suggest random returns for the first
month. This data does not support the findings of Ibbotson and Jaffe who suggest the first month returns are
predictable. The inconsistent X coefficients and varying values of R squared fail to provide statistically
significant evidence in support of or contrary to the past empirical and theoretical IPO underpricing research.
FIGURE 12 Unadiusted and Market-Adiusted Return Summary
UNADJUSTED RETURNS
Percent
Average Standard Minimum Maximum
Day Return Deviation Return Return
1 12.15% 19.43% -17.71 % 96.77%
2 0.67% 4.25% -10.26% 16.92%
3 -0.22% 3.56% -11.36% 16.42 %
4 -0.03 % 3.51 % -9.09 % 13.41 %
5 -0.33 % 3.43% -12.24% 9.68%
6 -0.22% 3.86% -13.51 % 13.95%
7 -0.19% 4.01 % -14.29% 13.79%
8 -0.48 % 3.85% -14.29% 11.34%
9 -0.17% 4.26% -12.68% 13.95%
10 0.23% 3.93% -11.43% 18.52%
11 0.15% 4.22% -23.40% 16.85%
12 -0.83% 3.50% -12.00% 9.26%
I
13 0.01 % 4.11 % -13.51 % 12.36%
14 0.12% 4.16% -10.53 % 21. 26 %
15 0.00% 4.60% -12.20% 16.92%
,16 -0.22% 4.01 % -12.35% 11.63 %
17 0.33% 4.32% -13.51 % 12.96%
I
18 -0.02 % 4.55% -14.89% 21.21 %
19 0.15% 4.26% -13.89% 20.00%




Average Standard Minimum Maximum
Day Return Deviation Return Return
1 12.09% 19.18% -17.29% 96.53%
2 0.65% 4.26% -10.62% 17.19%
3 -0.16% 3.55% -11.01% 16.29%
4 -0.06% 3.37% -7.52% 12.21 %
5 -0.36 % 3.37% -11.68% 8.94%
~6
-0.17% 3.67% -12.75% 12.17%
7 -0.12 % 4.00% -13.27% 13.74%
8 -0.43 % 3.81 % -13.55% 12.36%
9 -0.25% 4.22% -13.55% 13.21 %
, 10 0.10% 3.77% -11. 95 % 17.31 %
I
11 0.10% 4.21 % -25.12% 15.44 %
12 -0.97% 3.40% -11. 73 % 8.43%
I
13 -0.01 % 3.94% -11.59% 12.11 %
14 0.18% 4.12% -10.11 % 20.51 %
I 15 -0.01 % 4.39% -12.49% 15.78%
I
16 -0.34% 3.99% -12.79% 11.70 %
17 0.28% 4.12% -13.14% 12.54%
I
18 0.16% 4.46% -14.64% 21. 78 %
19 0.14% 4.14% -12.72% 20.40 %
I






Error of R X Error
Day Y Estimate Squared Coefficient of Coefficient
1 0.1879 0.0776 5.4330 1.5559
2 0.0426 0.0082 0.4218 0.3861
3 0.0355 0.0180 0.5472 0.3361
4 0.0339 0.0799 1.1870 0.3345
5 0.0339 0.0362 0.9027 0.3866
6 0.0365 0.1170 1.7408 0.3973
7 0.0400 0.0151 0.5781 0.3889
8 0.0383 0.0225 0.7983 0.4366
9 0.0424 0.0223 0.7741 0.4252
10 0.0379 0.0866 1.2523 0.3377
11 0.0422 0.0133 0.5730 0.4105
12 0.0343 0.0568 1.1420 0.3863
13 0.0394 0.0930 1.6556 0.4294
14 0.0414 0.0208 0.7472 0.4258
15 0.0436 0.1150 1.8375 0.4234
16 0.0400 0.0169 0.5987 0.3788
17 0.0410 0.1123 1.7841 0.4164
18 0.0450 0.0374 1.0570 0.4451
19 0.0416 0.0620 1.2767 0.4124
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